# Safety Management System Performance Measurement Report

October 2026




Endeavour Energy

POWER together

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# Executive Summary

This Annual Safety Management System Performance Measurement Report has been prepared in accordance with the *Electricity Networks Reporting Manual – Safety Management System Performance Measurement*[a] (March 2026) issued by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), as part of Endeavour Energy's statutory reporting obligations.

The report outlines the performance of Endeavour Energy's Electricity Network Safety Management System (ENSMS), which is implemented in accordance with the *Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation 2014*.

The report is presented in two sections:

- Section A: Annual Safety Performance Report, covering the period 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026.
- Section B: Bushfire Preparedness, covering the period 1 October 2025 to 30 September 2026.

Where available, historical data has been included to provide context and support trend analysis. Endeavour Energy continues to refine and enhance historical reporting as systems and data availability improve.

In this report:


- a dash ("-") indicates that no data is available for the reporting period;
- a value of "0" indicates that data is available and the reported outcome is zero; and
- explanatory notes or footnotes have been provided where further clarification is required.

A separate Basis of Preparation document has been provided to IPART in support of Endeavour Energy's Annual Safety Management System Performance Measurement Report. It outlines the sources of the reported data, key assumptions and other relevant information to assist IPART in understanding the information presented.

[a] The *Electricity Networks Reporting Manual – Safety Management System Performance Measurement* is available on IPART's website here: https://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au/Home/Industries/Energy/Energy-Networks-Safety-Reliability-and-Compliance/Electricity-networks/Electricity-Networks-Reporting.

# Annual Safety Performance Report

## Section A



Endeavour Energy

# A.1 Tier 1 – Major incidents

Tier 1 incidents are defined as a 'Major Incident' in accordance with the *Electricity Networks Reporting Manual – Incident Reporting* (Reporting Manual – Incident Reporting)[a].

Table A.1 Major incidents

| ESSNM Objective | | Description of each major incident reported under the Reporting Manual – Incident Reporting requirements |
|---|---|---|
| Safety of members of the public | | Nil reported. |
| Safety of persons working on the network | | Nil reported. |
| Protection of property | Third party property | On 9 December 2025, a bushfire occurred in the vicinity of Home Hills Road, Bogee. The fire burnt approximately 648 hectares, predominantly across private land, and resulted in damage to five private structures across three properties.<br><br>Based on analysis of site evidence, network data, weather conditions, and vegetation assessments, the most likely cause of ignition was a wind-blown tree branch contacting the SWER conductor, resulting in intermittent arcing and ignition of dry ground fuels beneath the line. Post-incident site inspection identified a branch hanging from the SWER conductor with evidence of arcing near ground level, and the point of branch failure was located on a tall tree adjacent to the line. Vegetation clearance measurements taken during the site visit confirmed that the span was compliant with clearance requirements at the time of inspection and was cleared to sky. |
| | Network property[b] | Nil reported. |
| Safety risks arising from loss of electricity supply[c] | | Nil reported. |

[a] The Reporting Manual – Incident Reporting is available on IPART's website here: https://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au/Home/Industries/Energy/Energy-Networks-Safety-Reliability-and-Compliance/Electricity-networks/Electricity-Networks-Reporting.

[b] Network property losses are not reportable under IPART's Reporting Manual - Incident Reporting requirements. For the purpose of this Reporting Manual, a network operator is to report each event in which losses exceed $500,000 in relation to damage caused to electricity works as defined in the Electricity Supply Act 1995.

[c] As defined for major reliability incidents in IPART's Reporting Manual – Incident Reporting.

# A.2 Tier 2 – Incidents

Tier 2 incidents are defined as an ‘Incident’ in accordance with the Reporting Manual – Incident Reporting.

Table A.2 Incidents

| ESSNM Objective | Description of each major incident reported under the Reporting Manual – Incident Reporting requirements |
|---|---|
| Safety of members of the public | On 13 January 2026, whilst installing a spa, a private electrician drilled through the back of a customer’s switchboard and contacted Endeavour Energy’s service mains resulting in burns to their hands. The injured electrician was transported to hospital via ambulance for medical treatment. |
| Safety of persons working on the network | On 13 September 2025, a worker fell from a ladder while descending after completing switching activities and removing a set of overhead portable earths. The injured worker required medical treatment. |
| | On 9 October 2025, a worker was exiting a trench when they slipped and fell injuring their shoulder. The injured worker required medical treatment. |
| | On 28 January 2026, a worker injured their hand when pole tamper equipment kicked back, causing their hand to strike the crane hook. The injured worker required medical treatment. |
| | On 23 February 2026, a worker was struck in the back by a falling tree branch that broke away during controlled vegetation removal activities. The injured worker required medical treatment. |
| | On 21 May 2026, a worker injured their finger when attempting to remove a jammed drill bit from pole-drilling equipment. The injured worker required medical treatment. |
| Protection of property | On 29 November 2025, an 11-hectare grass/bushfire occurred adjacent to bare low voltage (LV) mains at North Richmond.<br><br>Due to strong wind gusts of up to 74km/h at the time of the incident, it is likely that a tree branch has been blown from outside the vegetation clearance window onto the bare LV mains, causing the two outer phase conductors to clash momentarily and leading to molten metal from the mains falling on to the dry grass below. |
| Safety risks arising from loss of electricity supply[a] | On 1 and 2 July 2025, severe storms impacted Endeavour Energy's network area. These dates were classified as Major Event Days[b] (MEDs) due to the impact on the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), with daily SAIDI values of 9.1 minutes on 1 July and 9.9 minutes on 2 July. |

[a] As defined for reliability incidents in IPART’s Reporting Manual – Incident Reporting
[b] Major Event Day has the meaning given in clause A.7.2 of Appendix A to Endeavour Energy’s Distributor’s Licence in effect during FY26.

| ESSNM Objective | Description of each major incident reported under the Reporting Manual – Incident Reporting requirements |
|---|---|
| | An Incident Management Team (IMT) was established, and storm centres were opened in Nowra/Ulladulla, Moss Vale, Shellharbour, Springhill and Penrith Field Service Centres (FSCs). Additional Field Operations, System Operations and Contact Centre resources were mobilised to support the response, and planned works scheduled between 2 July and 4 July 2025 cancelled to maximise the availability of operational staff. |
| | On 26 November 2025, a severe storm impacted Endeavour Energy's network area. This date was classified as a MED due to the impact on SAIDI, with a SAIDI value of 65 minutes.<br><br>An IMT was established, and storm centres opened in Kings Park/Parramatta and Penrith/Windsor FSCs. All planned works were cancelled, and additional resources were directed from less impacted areas to assist with the response. |
| | On 29 November 2025, a severe storm impacted Endeavour Energy's network area. This event was classified as a MED due to the impact on SAIDI, with SAIDI value of 8 minutes.<br><br>An IMT was established, and storm centres opened in Kings Park/Parramatta and Penrith/Windsor FSCs. All planned works were cancelled, and additional resources were directed from less impacted areas to assist with the response.<br><br>This second storm event occurred while restoration efforts from the 26 November 2025 storm were still ongoing, further impacting the network and delaying customer restoration activities. |

# A.3 Tier 3 – Control failure near miss

Table A.3 Network asset failures

| Performance measure | Population | 5-year average annual functional failures | Annual functional failures (for reporting period) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Unassisted[a] | | | Assisted[a] | | |
| | | | Fire | | | Fire | | |
| | | | No fire | Contained | Escaped | No fire | Contained | Escaped |
| Towers | 832 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Poles (including streetlighting columns/poles & stay poles) | 579,052 | 37.8 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 1 |
| Pole-top structures[b] | 373,715 | 80.2 | 34 | 27 | 0 | 20 | 5 | 3 |
| Conductor – Transmission OH[c] | 3,015 | 4.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 2 |
| Conductor – Transmission UG[c] | 477 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Conductor – HV[d] (including sub-transmission) OH | 11,159 | 259.6 | 68 | 2 | 5 | 349 | 2 | 22 |
| Conductor – HV (including sub-transmission) UG | 6,419 | 36.2 | 60 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 0 |
| Conductor – LV[d] OH | 8,352 | 222.6 | 54 | 5 | 3 | 190 | 0 | 2 |
| Conductor – LV UG | 11,821 | 107.8 | 109 | 21 | 10 | 26 | 1 | 3 |
| Service line[e] OH | 450,006 | 412.6 | 256 | 3 | 1 | 242 | 1 | 2 |
| Service line[e] UG | 443,548 | 135.2 | 96 | 3 | 0 | 16 | 1 | 0 |

[a] See Glossary for definitions of unassisted failures and assisted failures.
[b] Pole-top structures/components are any structure that is attached to a pole to support electricity mains and apparatus.
[c] OH means 'overhead'; and UG means 'underground'. Transmission and sub-transmission voltages are generally 33kV AC nominal and above. Transmission conductors form part of a transmission network. Sub-transmission conductors form part of a distribution network.
[d] HV means 'high voltage', and LV means 'low voltage'. High voltage are voltages 1kV AC nominal and above. Low voltage are voltages below 1kV AC nominal.
[e] Overhead service and underground service as defined in the NSW Service and Installation Rules.

| Performance measure | Population | 5-year average annual functional failures | Annual functional failures (for reporting period) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Unassisted[a] | | | Assisted[a] | | |
| | | | Fire | | | Fire | | |
| | | | No fire | Contained | Escaped | No fire | Contained | Escaped |
| Power transformers[f] | 496 | 1.4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Distribution transformers | 35,564 | 45.6 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 45 | 0 | 0 |
| Reactive plant[g] | 188 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Switchgear – zone/sub-transmission/transmission substation | 4,812 | 4.6 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Switchgear – distribution (OH) | 44,240 | 164.2 | 127 | 5 | 2 | 69 | 1 | 0 |
| Switchgear – distribution (ground-based) | 37,364 | 19.8 | 1 | 15 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Protection relays or systems | 20,647 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Zone/sub-transmission/transmission substation SCADA system | 228 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Zone/sub-transmission/transmission substation Protection Batteries | 297 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Network SAPS[h] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

[f] Power Transformers are transformers where the secondary/output voltage is 5kV nominal or above.
[g] Reactive plants are reactors and capacitors.
[h] Endeavour Energy does not own, control, or operate any temporary, emergency, or permanent Network SAPS.

Table A.4 Vegetation contact with conductors

| Performance measurement[a] | Event count – Current reporting period (FY26) | Event count – Last reporting period (FY25) | Event count – Two periods ago (FY24) | Event count – Three periods ago (FY23) | Event count – Four periods ago (FY22) | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fire starts – grow-in | 4 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | Higher-than-anticipated vegetation growth during the year contributed to an increase in vegetation-related fire starts, with vegetation encroaching on HV mains between scheduled trimming cycles. |
| Fire start – fall-in and blow-in | 48 | 43 | 35 | 17 | 14 | The increase in fire starts associated with falling and wind-blown vegetation reflects the impacts of more frequent and severe storm events, which contributed to greater vegetation damage across the network area. |
| Interruption[b] – grow-in | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Interruption – fall-in and blow-in | 1,477 | 1,527 | 910 | 857 | 1,451 | This result remains elevated compared to FY24 and reflects the ongoing impact of weather-related events across the network. While weather-related incidents declined slightly from FY25, the impact of severe storms in FY26 remained higher than historical levels. |

[a] Vegetation hazard definitions as per the Industry Safety Steering Committee ISSC 3 – Guide for the Management of Vegetation in the Vicinity of Electricity Assets.
[b] Includes momentary interruptions.

Table A.5 Unintended contact, unauthorised access and electric shocks

| Detail | Event count – Current reporting period (FY26) | Event count – Last reporting period (FY25) | Event count – Two periods ago (FY24) | Event count – Three periods ago (FY23) | Event count – Four periods ago (FY22) | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Electric shock[i] and arc flash incidents[j] originating from network assets[k] including those received in customer premises** | | | | | | |
| Public | 87 | 83 | 89 | 62 | 85 | |
| Public worker | 0 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 9 | |
| Network employee/network contractor[l] | 0 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 4 | |
| Accredited Service Provider | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | |
| Livestock or domestic pet | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | |
| **Contact with energised overhead network asset[m] (eg. conductor strike)** | | | | | | |
| Public road vehicle[n] | 423 | 338 | 325 | 211 | 162 | |
| Plant and equipment[o] | 32 | 28 | 18 | 23 | 62 | |
| Agricultural and other[p] | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | |
| Network vehicle | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | |
| **Contact with energised underground network asset[e] (eg. conductor strike)** | | | | | | |
| Plant and equipment | 15 | 39 | 52 | 40 | 57 | |

[i] All electric shocks are to be reported except those resulting from static discharge, defibrillators, where the system is nominally extra low voltage or involving the DC rail traction system.
[j] Incidents that result in a burn or other injury requiring medical treatment and result from exposure to an arc.
[k] Events caused by network assets, network asset defects, or network activities, including shocks received inside customer installations, are to be reported. Customer installation events not associated with network assets are not to be reported.
[l] Includes all classes of authorised persons (network employee and network contractor). Accredited Service Provider employees are not included.
[e] Would not normally include contact with a pole, pillar, distribution substation etc, unless the contact results in subsequent contact with an energised asset.
[f] Including plant and equipment packed up for travel (ie. plant and equipment travelling on a public road to or from worksite).
[g] Cranes, elevated work platforms, cherry pickers, excavators, handheld tools, etc.
[h] Examples include agricultural equipment, aircraft, and watercraft.

| Detail | Event count – Current reporting period (FY26) | Event count – Last reporting period (FY25) | Event count – Two periods ago (FY24) | Event count – Three periods ago (FY23) | Event count – Four periods ago (FY22) | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Person with handheld tool | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| **Unauthorised network access (intentional)** | | | | | | |
| Zone/BSP/Transmission substation/switching station | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | |
| Distribution substation | 8 | 16 | 9 | 19 | 30 | |
| Towers/poles | 45 | 95 | 8 | 51 | 82 | |
| Other (eg. communication sites) | 2 | 3 | 20 | 0 | 0 | |
| **Safe Approach Distance (SAD)[q]** | | | | | | |
| Network employee/network contractor | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | |
| Accredited Service Provider | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Public | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Public worker | 0 | 22 | 16 | 12 | 0 | |

[e] Would not normally include contact with a pole, pillar, distribution substation etc, unless the contact results in subsequent contact with an energised asset.
[q] Encroachment into the applicable Safe Approach Distance for the type of individual involved.

Table A.6 Reliability and Quality of Supply[a]

| Performance measure | Event count – Current reporting period (FY26) | Event count – Last reporting period (FY25) | Event count – Two periods ago (FY24) | Event count – Three periods ago (FY23) | Event count – Four periods ago (FY22) | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High voltage into low voltage[b] | 120 | 107 | 119 | 81 | 51 | |
| Sustained voltage excursions outside emergency range[c] | 2,327,491 | 2,193,020 | 683,101 | 305,907 | 80,758 | |
| Reverse polarity | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Neutral integrity due to poor workmanship or incorrect procedure | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | |
| Neutral integrity due to asset defect or failure | 209 | 304 | 136 | 0 | 0 | |

[a] Reporting is required by distribution network operators only.
[b] May also be referred to as HV LV intermix or HV injection.
[c] As defined by network operator with reference to the measurement methodologies used in Australian Standard AS61000.3.100.

Table A.7 Reliability and Quality of Supply – Critical infrastructure incidents[a]

| Type of critical infrastructure[b] (eg. hospital, tunnel) | Minutes of supply lost[c] | Cause | Consequential safety impacts associated with supply issue |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hospital - Category B2 | 80 | Foreign Interference | No safety impacts resulted from the outage as alternate methods of supply was available. |
| Hospital - Category A1 | 86 | Tree contact | No safety impacts resulted from the outage as alternate methods of supply was available. |
| Rail and air transport systems where travel is affected | 9 | Unknown | Outage not reportable as was less than two hours. |
| Rail and air transport systems where travel is affected | 256 | Adverse weather | Outage not reportable as it did not affect travel due to the time of the incident and the size/purpose of the airport. |
| Rail and air transport systems where travel is affected | 114 | Tree contact | Outage not reportable as was less than two hours. |
| Rail and air transport systems where travel is affected | 130 | Adverse weather | Outage not reportable as it did not affect travel due to the time of the incident and the size/purpose of the airport. |
| Rail and air transport systems where travel is affected | 167 | Defective equipment | Outage not reportable as it did not affect travel due to the time of the incident and the size/purpose of the airport. |
| Events and buildings where greater than 5,000 people could be affected by an outage | 39 | Defective equipment | Outage not reportable as was less than two hours. No associated safety impacts were identified. |
| Events and buildings where greater than 5,000 people could be affected by an outage | 127 | Adverse weather | Outage not reportable as there was no event on at the premises at the time of the outage. No associated safety impacts were identified. |
| Events and buildings where greater than 5,000 people could be affected by an outage | 25 | Adverse weather | Outage not reportable as was less than two hours. No associated safety impacts were identified. |
| Events and buildings where greater than 5,000 people could be affected by an outage | 49 | Defective equipment | Outage not reportable as was less than two hours. No associated safety impacts were identified. |
| Events and buildings where greater than 5,000 people could be affected by an outage | 86 | Tree contact | Outage not reportable as was less than two hours. No associated safety impacts were identified. |
| Events and buildings where greater than 5,000 people could be affected by an outage | 72 | Defective equipment | Outage not reportable as was less than two hours. No associated safety impacts were identified. |
| Events and buildings where greater than 5,000 people could be affected by an outage | 439 | Defective equipment | Outage not reportable as there was no event on at the premises at the time of the outage. No associated safety impacts were identified. |
| Events and buildings where greater than 5,000 people could be affected by an outage | 71 | Defective equipment | Outage not reportable as was less than two hours. No associated safety impacts were identified. |
| Events and buildings where greater than 5,000 people could be affected by an outage | 21 | Defective equipment | Outage not reportable as was less than two hours. No associated safety impacts were identified. |

[a] Note: Incidents include outages and supply quality events that adversely impact critical infrastructure
[b] Critical infrastructure as identified in the network operator's formal safety assessment in relation to the safety risks associated with loss of supply.
[c] Number of minutes that the critical infrastructure was without a network supply.

Table A.8 Network-initiated Property damage events

| Detail | Event count – Current reporting period (FY26) | Event count – Last reporting period (FY25) | Event count – Two periods ago (FY24) | Event count – Three periods ago (FY23) | Event count – Four periods ago (FY22) | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Third party property (assets including vehicles, buildings, crops, livestock)** | | | | | | |
| Damage (eg. Fire, Physical impact or Electrical) | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 1 | For further details, refer to Table A.1. |
| **Network property (including non-electrical assets including vehicles, buildings)** | | | | | | |
| Damage (eg. Fire, Physical impact or Electrical) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |

Note: Event counts include any event where there is a reasonable likelihood that damage was caused by electricity works.

# A.4 Tier 4 – Control Implementation

**Formal Safety Assessments**

Endeavour Energy's ENSMS consists of five Formal Safety Assessments (FSA) that address the following risks:

- Bushfire;
- Safety risks due to Loss of Supply;
- Public Safety[a];
- Worker Injury – Electrical[b]; and
- Worker Injury – Non-Electrical.

Table A.9 outlines amendments and/or improvements made to Endeavour Energy's FSAs during FY26, and the Treatment Action Plans (TAP) developed and/or in progress.

A.9 Amendments and improvements to Formal Safety Assessments (FSA) or Associated Risk Treatments[c]

| FSA | Amendments/Improvements |
|---|---|
| Bushfire | No amendments were made to the Bushfire FSA during the reporting period. However, the increased use of AI tools over the past year has improved fire incident identification and data quality. |
| Loss of Supply | No amendments were made to the Loss of Supply FSA during the reporting period. However, implementation of fault location, isolation and service restoration (FLISR) continued during FY26, with an additional 251 feeders becoming operational, resulting in coverage for 60% of customers. |
| Public Safety | No amendments were made to the Public Safety FSA during the reporting period. However, a review of the Reverse Polarity Procedure commenced during the reporting period to assess and strengthen controls aimed at reducing the risk of public electric shock incidents arising from network service connection work undertaken by Endeavour Energy crews. |
| Worker Injury – Electrical | No amendments were made to the Worker Injury – Electrical FSA during the reporting period. However, a review commenced during the reporting period to assess opportunities to strengthen the application of ALARP principles within the FSA. |
| Worker Injury – Non-Electrical | No amendments were made to the Worker Injury – Non-Electrical FSA during the reporting period. However, broader strategic safety initiatives have been introduced to enhance leadership engagement and strengthen assurance over the implementation and effectiveness of critical safety controls. These programs support Endeavour Energy's broader approach to safety risk management and included Heavy Vehicle National Law (implementation of the RoadReady App), Leader Led Fatal Risk Control Checks, and Health and Safety Leadership Fundamentals Training for operational leaders. |

[a] This FSA also addresses the risk of harm to third-party property apart from damage due to network-initiated bushfires.
[b] This includes the risk of injury through both electric shock and arc flash.
[c] Adjustment or modifications made by the network operator to formal safety assessments, or risk treatment action plans, including those changes informed by consideration of the results of the investigation and analysis of incidents, near misses or asset failures, where the network operator has assessed that existing assessments or risk treatments do not eliminate or reduce risk so far as is reasonably practicable.

**Environmental Management System**

Risks of environmental harm are managed through the implementation of Endeavour Energy's ISO 14001-certified Environmental Management System (EMS). During FY26, the EMS Manual was revised to strengthen the integration of sustainability requirements and associated Environmental Management Standards were updated to reflect the latest regulatory obligations. The EMS was independently audited in November 2025 and was found to be well implemented and conform with the requirements of the standard.

Table A.10 Design, construction and commissioning

| Performance measure[a] | Current reporting period (FY26) | Last reporting period (FY25) | Two reporting periods ago (FY24) | Three reporting periods ago (FY23) | Four reporting periods ago (FY22) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Designs for which Safety in Design (SiD) Reports have been completed *(previous methodology)*[b] | - | - | 1,012 | 541 | 843 |
| Designs for which Safety in Design (SiD) Reports have been completed *(new methodology)*[c] | 416 | 425 | 409 | 439 | 434 |
| Designs for which Safety in Design (SiD) Reports have been audited[d] | 40 | 0[e] | 26 | 10 | 0 |
| Contestable designs certified[f] | 1,203 | 1,221 | 1,166 | 1,319 | 1,394 |
| Contestable level 1 project safety reviews performed | 1,331 | 790 | 1,074 | 1,042 | 865 |
| Contestable level 2 project safety reviews performed[g] | 406 | 152 | 136 | 197 | 210 |
| Non-contestable project safety reviews performed | 3,319 | 3,885 | 5,289 | 3,996 | 2,469 |
| Project closeout reports completed for contestable projects | 920 | 702 | 761 | 838 | 1,204 |
| Project closeout reports completed for non-contestable projects | 207 | 182 | 301 | 268 | 217 |

**Contestable project safety reviews**

The increase in the number of Contestable level 1 and level 2 project safety reviews is attributable to increased contestable project volumes within Endeavour Energy's network area, leading to a corresponding increase in safety review requirements.

**Project close-out reports**

The increase in project close-out reports reflects a higher number of contestable and non-contestable projects reaching completion and commissioning during FY26.

[a] The unit of measure is the number of designs/projects.
[b] The previous methodology counted individual design elements within a project separately. As SiD Reports are undertaken at the project level, the methodology was revised in FY25 and is now reported under New Methodology – Designs for which Safety in Design (SiD) Reports have been completed.
[c] The new methodology counts SiD Reports at the project level, with one SiD Report completed per internal ("K") project.
[d] The updated SiD process includes a target for 10% of SiD Reports to be audited for completeness, in addition to the standard design approval process undertaken by the Engineering Design Leadership Team.
[e] The SiD process, templates and supporting procedures were comprehensively reviewed and updated during FY25. As a result, no SID Reports were audited during the financial year.
[f] The network operator is to advise where no contestable designs have been performed.
[g] A safety review would include checking that work on or near the network is being performed safely.

Table A.11 Inspections (assets)

| Performance measure[a] | Planned inspection tasks[b] | Inspection tasks | | | Tasks identified (all categories)[c] | Corrective action tasks | | | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Achieved[c] | Open[d] | Outstanding[d] | | Achieved | Open | Outstanding[e] | |
| Transmission/Zone Substations | 41,365 | 31,321 | 0 | 10,044 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 2 | |
| Distribution Substations | 15,148 | 741 | 0 | 14,407 | 696 | 28 | 136 | 532 | |
| Transmission OH | 4,056 | 3,643 | 0 | 413 | 113 | 25 | 28 | 60 | |
| Transmission UG | 2,603 | 1,347 | 0 | 1,256 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | |
| Distribution OH[f] | 81,753 | 81,517 | 230 | 0 | 2,997 | 501 | 521 | 1,975 | |
| Distribution UG | 31,349 | 28,675 | 0 | 2,674 | 852 | 58 | 310 | 484 | |
| Network SAPS[g] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Endeavour Energy does not own, control or operate any temporary, emergency or permanent Network SAPS. |

Endeavour Energy's transition to a Risk-Based Maintenance, Inspection and Defect Program has resulted in evolving operational requirements, including changes to work practices, additional training needs, and increased inspection volumes beyond historical levels across the Transmission and Distribution networks.

In response, the business is investing in workforce capability, refining processes, and supplementing internal capacity with external resources to ensure risk-prioritised work is delivered effectively. As the risk-based approach and supporting models continue to mature, annual workload demands and resource requirements are expected to vary over time.

[a] Table A.11 does not include activities reported in Table B.3 (Vegetation tasks) and Table B.4 (Asset tasks).
[b] Includes all 'Open' and 'Outstanding' tasks from the previous reporting period.
[c] Inspection tasks must only be reported as 'Achieved' when all associated corrective action tasks to address the faults of a particular asset have been identified.
[d] All Inspections due in FY26 that are Open as at 30 Jun 2026 are considered 'Outstanding'.
[e] The network operator must provide commentary to explain how it is managing risk associated with outstanding tasks and when the outstanding tasks are expected to be completed.
[f] This includes OLI/GLI, Endeavour Energy's primary overhead inspection program, which generates the majority of corrective actions for the distribution overhead network.
[g] Distribution UG inspections are being undertaken in accordance with the remediation action outlined in Endeavour Energy's 2025 ENSMS Audit Compliance Improvement Plan.
[h] This may include temporary, emergency, or permanent SAPS. See Glossary for the definition of Network SAPS.

Table A.12 Inspections (vegetation) Aerial/Ground-based

| Bushfire risk category | Population (spans/poles) | Target | Achieved | Outstanding | Open | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Aerial**[a] | | | | | | |
| Total | 118,257 | 118,257 | 118,257 | 0 | 0 | Covered in Table B.2. |
| **Ground-based**[b] | | | | | | |
| Total | 390,187 | 390,187 | 390,187 | 0 | 0 | Of which 101,760 spans identified for cutting and 101,760 achieved for cutting. |

Note: Table A.12 does not include activities reported in Table B.3 (Vegetation tasks) and Table B.4 (Asset tasks).

[a] For FY26, the reported Population (spans/poles) for Aerial only covers those in bushfire prone areas that are subject to inspection as a part of Endeavour Energy's PSBI Program.
[b] This includes traditional routine vegetation management activities.

Table A.13 Public electrical safety plans and activities[a]

| Network operator public safety programs/ campaigns | Details |
|---|---|
| Public Safety Plan | Endeavour Energy's Public Safety Plan is reviewed annually to ensure it remains current and effective, incorporating emerging risks, opportunities for improvement and initiatives across the business that contribute to reducing public safety risk and improving community safety outcomes. |
| Public Safety Communications Plan | External Communications continue to release timely and impactful messaging centred around warning and educating members of public about hazards during extreme weather events. Electricity Safety Week continued to be popular across the schools in the Endeavour Energy network area. |


**Public Safety Social Media Awareness Campaign**

Endeavour Energy delivers a public safety awareness social media campaign each year to help educate the community about the safe use of electricity and the hazards associated with the electricity network. Through a range of digital communications, the campaign provides practical safety information, raises awareness of potential risks, and encourages behaviours that help prevent incidents. Content may address a broad range of electrical safety topics relevant to the public or be tailored to specific activities, locations, industries or seasonal conditions where additional safety awareness is beneficial.













Recent campaigns have focused on bushfire preparedness[b], storm safety[c] and Think Before You Dig awareness. These initiatives provide practical safety advice, reinforce key public safety messages and encourage safe behaviours to help reduce the risk of incidents involving the electricity network.

[a] Details of Endeavour Energy's public electrical safety awareness activities, including safety campaigns, community education initiatives, bushfire risk management communications, and shocks and tingles awareness programs.
[b] Further information on bushfire safety is available on Endeavour Energy's website: https://www.endeavourenergy.com.au/for-your-home/safety/electrical-safety-at-home.
[c] Further information on storm safety is available on Endeavour Energy's website: https://www.endeavourenergy.com.au/for-your-home/safety/electrical-safety-at-home.




### Electricity Safety Week


As part of its commitment to public safety, Endeavour Energy continues to participate in Electricity Safety Week each year, supporting an interactive education program that helps primary school students understand how electricity works, recognise electrical hazards and learn how to stay safe around electricity at home, at school and in the community. Through curriculum-aligned resources, classroom activities and practical safety lessons, students learn about topics such as fallen powerlines, electrical appliances and electrical storms.

The program plays an important role in building community awareness of electrical safety and fostering safe behaviours from an early age. Electricity Safety Week provides an opportunity to reinforce key public safety messages and equip the next generation with the knowledge and confidence to recognise hazards and stay safe around electricity, both indoors and outdoors.

In FY26, 98% of primary schools across Endeavour Energy's network area registered to receive the Electricity Safety Week resource pack. The curriculum-aligned resources are designed to raise awareness of electrical hazards and support teachers in delivering learning outcomes under the NSW K–6 Personal Development, Health and Physical Education (PDHPE) and Science and Technology syllabuses, helping students develop the practical knowledge and skills needed to stay safe around electricity.

### Electrical safety at home

Endeavour Energy's social media channels are used to reinforce key electrical safety messages and provide practical advice on recognising potential electrical hazards in and around the home. Campaign messaging provides guidance on identifying warning signs of electrical faults, such as flickering lights, faulty appliances or tingling sensations from taps[d], and reinforces the importance of seeking professional assistance rather than attempting repairs. Content also encourages customers to report safety concerns and seek qualified assistance where required, helping to build community awareness and prevent electrical incidents. These messages are supported by electrical safety information and resources available on Endeavour Energy's website[e], providing customers with access to practical guidance on staying safe around electricity and understanding how to respond to potential hazards.




[d] Further information on recognising and responding to tingling taps and other potential signs of electrical faults: https://youtu.be/oylbcziUie8?si=nzT40mvx6054VYCB.
[e] Further information and electrical safety resources are available on Endeavour Energy's website: https://www.endeavourenergy.com.au/for-your-home/safety/electrical-safety-at-home.

Table A.14 Internal audits performed on any aspect of the ENSMS (as per AS 5577[a] clause 4.5.4)

| Audit scope | Identified non-compliances | Actions taken or proposed by network operator[b] |
|---|---|---|
| Incident Management Process | Nil identified | • Review and update the Incident Management Plan (IMP) to address the detailed findings and strengthen incident management governance, and supporting arrangements, including alignment of associated policies and procedures;<br>• Review and enhance incident management forms, documentation and record-keeping practices to address the detailed findings and improve usability, auditability and record retention;<br>• Assess the feasibility of establishing a centralised enterprise-wide incident management system to address the detailed findings and improve incident oversight, coordination and management;<br>• Review and update incident management induction, team structure and role allocation arrangements to address the detailed findings and improve incident management capability, governance and operational resilience; and<br>• Establish and implement an enterprise incident exercise program to address the detailed findings and improve organisational preparedness, capability and response effectiveness. |
| Management of Low Voltage Parallels | Nil identified | • Review and strengthen controls for planned LV work requests to address the detailed findings and improve assurance that all work is appropriately requested, approved and recorded;<br>• Implement system and procedural controls over work request authorisation to address the detailed findings and improve the integrity of the switching approval process;<br>• Implement worksite verification activities to address the detailed findings and improve adherence to approved switching plans and work practices; and<br>• Implement processes to identify and rectify abnormal network alterations and unrecorded network changes to address the detailed findings and improve the accuracy, completeness and currency of network information within ADMS. |
| Pre-Summer Bushfire Inspection – Pole Top Hardware Defects | Nil identified | • Develop and implement a documented PSBI process to address the detailed findings and improve governance, accountability and monitoring of program delivery; |

[a] AS5577 is the Australian Standard for Electricity Network Safety Management Systems published in 2013 by Standards Australia.
[b] Includes actions identified in response to internal audit key findings assessed as having a medium risk rating or higher.

| Audit scope | Identified non-compliances | Actions taken or proposed by network operator[b] |
|---|---|---|
| | | • Review and enhance PSBI reporting arrangements to address the detailed findings and improve data consistency, usability and reconciliation across reporting sources;<br>• Implement routine reconciliation of PSBI remediation data to address the detailed findings and improve the accuracy and completeness of work order tracking information;<br>• Undertake reconciliation activities to address the detailed findings and improve confidence that all defects identified through inspection activities have been appropriately reviewed and assessed;<br>• Develop and implement a formal sampling methodology to address the detailed findings and improve the consistency, reliability and effectiveness of defect review activities;<br>• Review and remediate duplicate work orders to address the detailed findings and improve the accuracy and integrity of defect management records;<br>• Implement controls for defect reassignment and work order creation to address the detailed findings and improve the accuracy and efficiency of defect management processes; and<br>• Assess opportunities to leverage emerging technologies to address the detailed findings and improve the reliability, efficiency and accuracy of defect identification processes. |
| Psychosocial Risk | Nil identified | • Review and enhance psychosocial risk assessment processes to address the detailed findings and improve the consistency, completeness and effectiveness of psychosocial risk assessments across the organisation;<br>• Establish and implement a consistent approach to psychosocial risk recording, monitoring and reporting to address the detailed findings and improve risk visibility, oversight and decision-making;<br>• Review and refine psychosocial hazard categorisation arrangements to address the detailed findings and improve the accuracy, consistency and effectiveness of psychosocial risk assessment, treatment and monitoring activities; and<br>• Strengthen the integration of psychosocial risk assessment outcomes into control design and implementation to address the detailed findings and improve the effectiveness, proportionality and ongoing monitoring of psychosocial risk controls. |

Note: This table details the internal audits undertaken by Endeavour Energy during FY26 that are related to ENSMS or safety issues.


Table A.15 External audits performed on any aspect of the ENSMS (as per AS 5577 clause 4.5.4)

| Audit scope | Identified non-compliances | Actions taken or proposed by network operator |
|---|---|---|
| Asset Management | The resources that Endeavour Energy has identified to conduct asset inspections are not sufficient to ensure the nominated inspection periods are reliably met and that this is in breach of clause 4.4.2 of AS5577. | OLI/GLI:<br>• Assigned inspection due dates when inspection maps are issued and systematically monitor completion.<br>• Established monitoring processes and regular reminders to Pole Inspectors to promote timely completion of allocated inspections.<br>• Strengthened OLI/GLI inspection planning, tracking and governance processes to ensure inspection dates are reliably achieved.<br><br>Columns and Pillars:<br>• Commenced a targeted maintenance uplift program to address overdue inspections and strengthen the ongoing delivery of maintenance inspections.<br>• Increased inspection delivery significantly with all overdue Column and Pillar inspections forecast to be complete by the end of 2026.<br>• Established a flexible resourcing model to maintain inspection delivery during periods of peak operational demand. |
| | The resources that Endeavour Energy has identified to conduct defect rectification work is insufficient, leading to a backlog of overdue defects and that this is in breach of clause 4.4.2 of AS5577. | Defect Rectification:<br>• Implemented a risk-based defect prioritisation framework to enable a transition to a quantified, risk-based approach to defect rectification following a structured risk assessment used to determine where less onerous defect categorisation criteria may be applied while maintaining risk levels that are ALARP.<br>• Updated the maintenance policy, procedures and standards to reflect the change in approach.<br><br>Defect Key Performance Indicators and Tracking:<br>• Defect rectification KPIs have been established and are being tracked through supporting dashboards and processes.<br><br>Additional Resources:<br>• A coordinated external delivery strategy was formulated to support the timely completion of defect rectification activities, assist in managing peak demand across the portfolio and address the defect rectification backlog. |

| Audit scope | Identified non-compliances | Actions taken or proposed by network operator |
|---|---|---|
| | Endeavour Energy has not adequately demonstrated ALARP as required by AS5577 clause A4, noting this is also not compliant with clause B3 of AS5577.<br><br>Opportunities for further safety improvement, which are not adopted, are not documented and demonstrated to be grossly disproportionate to the risk they would control. | Formal Safety Assessments:<br>• FSAs are under review to ensure safety controls are documented and, where not adopted, a clear and evidence-based demonstration is provided that the controls are grossly disproportionate to the risk reduction achieved.<br><br>Risk-based Cost Justification Process:<br>• A risk-based cost justification procedure has been established and defines how Endeavour Energy assesses ALARP in accordance with AS5577 using both qualitative and quantitative risk assessment methods.<br><br>• A risk assessment of TB 0262 will be undertaken to assess the impact of the OLI/GLI inspection interval change, and formally document the outcome, including whether changes are required to the relevant standards. |
| | ENSMS documentation is overdue for review and that this is contrary to clause 4.4.1 of AS5577 and in some cases also contrary to the requirements of clause 4.6.1 of AS5577. | Update to ENSMS Documentation:<br>• A risk assessment of TB 0262 will be undertaken to assess the impact of the OLI/GLI inspection interval change, and formally document the outcome, including whether changes are required to the relevant standards.<br><br>• A structured ENSMS document review process has been completed. Documents identified as overdue or requiring updates to position titles and/or associated authorities and responsibilities have been identified, prioritised, and assigned to relevant stakeholders for update. |

# Bushfire Preparedness

## Section B



Endeavour Energy

# B.1 Bushfire risk profile across network operator's supply area

### Year in review

The Endeavour Energy network area[a] experienced a dry start to the fire season which continued throughout FY26, resulting in below average rainfall being recorded for the reporting period.

Below average rainfall during spring and summer contributed to elevated bushfire conditions across the Endeavour Energy network area, resulting in 14 Total Fire Ban (TOBAN) days being declared between late October and early February. Rainfall generally returned to average levels through autumn, resulting in reduced ground-fuel flammability. No further TOBAN days were declared during the season. Drier conditions returned in winter, leading to declining soil moisture levels and elevated fire-weather conditions heading into the next fire season.

Overall, FY26 was characterised by warmer and generally drier than average conditions. Despite these conditions, the Endeavour Energy network area experienced an overall average fire-risk profile during the reporting period.





Figure B.1: NSW Rainfall for October 2025 – September 2026





Figure B.2: NSW Rainfall forecast December 2026 – February 2027

### Forecast

The Bureau of Meteorology's (BoM) latest long-range outlook indicates that rainfall deficiencies are likely to persist across southern New South Wales (NSW) through spring. The rainfall outlook becomes more uncertain into summer due to the influence of competing climate drivers.

Daytime and overnight temperatures are forecast to remain above average. El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is currently strongly negative, with BoM advising that a strong La Niña event is underway, likely peaking in late spring or early summer and persisting into autumn 2027. The Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) is currently neutral and is likely to develop into a positive phase through spring and persist into early summer. Together, these climate drivers are expected to favour lower rainfall across the network area during spring and summer.

Consistent with the long-term outlook, the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council's (AFAC) *Seasonal Bushfire Outlook (Spring 2026)* expects average bushfire potential across the network area. The NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) *2026–27 Fire Season Outlook* notes that ongoing rainfall deficiencies and above average temperatures are expected to increase fire risk as grass curing and forest fuel recovery progress through the season.





Figure B.3: AFAC Spring 2026 Season NSW Bushfire Outlook

[a] For the purposes of this report, "network area" refers to the geographic area serviced by Endeavour Energy's electricity distribution network.

# B.2 Permanent/temporary declaration of areas by Rural Fire Service and network operator's actions

The NSW RFS may vary the commencement of the Bushfire Danger Period (BFDP) by Local Government Area (LGA) based on local weather, fuel and bushfire risk conditions. Two temporary changes were declared within the network area during the reporting period. The table below lists each LGA in Endeavour Energy's network area and their BFDP commencement date.

| LGA | Temporary | Permanent |
|---|---|---|
| **Greater Sydney Region** | | |
| Blacktown City | Nil | 1 October |
| Blue Mountains City | Nil | 1 October |
| Camden | Nil | 1 October |
| Campbelltown City | Nil | 1 October |
| Fairfield City | Nil | 1 October |
| Hawkesbury City | Nil | 1 October |
| Liverpool City | Nil | 1 October |
| Parramatta | Nil | 1 October |
| Penrith City | Nil | 1 October |
| The Hills Shire | Nil | 1 October |
| **Illawarra and Shoalhaven Region** | | |
| Kiama | Nil | 1 October |
| Shellharbour City | Nil | 1 October |
| Shoalhaven City | Nil | 1 September |
| Wingecarribee Shire | 14 September | 1 October |
| Wollondilly Shire | 14 September | 1 October |
| Wollongong City | Nil | 1 October |
| **Central Ranges Region** | | |
| Lithgow | Nil | 1 October |
| Mid-Western Regional | Nil | 1 October |



Figure B.4: Endeavour Energy network area

Endeavour Energy undertakes a range of year-round and seasonal bushfire risk mitigation activities designed to reduce bushfire risk and enhance network preparedness before and during the bushfire season. During the reporting period Endeavour Energy undertook the following activities to mitigate bushfire risks.

**PSBI and defect rectification**

To strengthen on-time delivery before the BFDP, and improve coverage in higher-exposure corridors, the PSBI program was re-prioritised and re-phased for 2025 and beyond. The re-prioritisation utilised bushfire risk modelling developed in conjunction with the University of Melbourne and NSW RFS to bring in additional high-risk poles not within the NSW Bushfire Prone Land Layer into Endeavour Energy's pre-summer program:

- **Map-based planning:** Endeavour Energy divided bushfire-prone corridors into inspection maps with clear annual or two-year frequencies. Maps with higher exposure (eg. long spans, steep or forested interfaces, historic ignition density, known wind corridors) are scheduled every year with lower exposure maps scheduled every second year. This creates a stable annual workload and removes end-of-season compression.
- **More poles in scope:** Each map now includes all poles on bushfire-prone land plus additional high-risk poles that were not previously in the program, increasing the number of poles inspected compared with previous programs. This improves continuity along high-risk areas and reduces missed spans at map boundaries.
- **Right method, right time:** Pole-top condition is inspected primarily with drone/high-definition (HD) imagery whilst vegetation clearances are assessed using LiDAR-derived analytics. These activities are decoupled and scheduled independently where appropriate, enabling each to be completed during the most suitable weather and access conditions.
- **Milestones aligned to BFDP:** Bushfire defects identified through the PSBI program on high-risk maps are required to be rectified before the commencement of the local BFDP (1 September for Shoalhaven and 1

October for all other LGAs). Delivery plans incorporate contingency allowances for weather and access-related delays.

- **Quality control:** An Overhead Line/Ground Line Inspection (OLI/GLI) validator reviews contractor-raised PSBI defects so that only genuine bushfire-relevant items proceed to remediation, with feedback loops to improve identification consistency.
- **Operational coordination:** Weekly dashboards track map burn-down, defect age, and close-out ahead of BFDP commencement dates. Where activities are delayed due to weather, landholder access or environmental constraints, make-up patrols or targeted ground inspections are undertaken to address any gaps.
- **Inspections methods:** Inspection methods combine aerial patrols where practicable with targeted ground patrols where aerial operations are constrained. LiDAR and imagery products are used to support vegetation clearance measurement, pole-top condition assessment, and defect identification.





Figure B.5: Re-prioritisation of Pre-summer Bushfire Inspection Program

### Routine maintenance

In addition to the annual PSBI program, routine maintenance activities and cyclic inspection programs also identify defects requiring remediation. Defects with the potential to increase bushfire risk are prioritised for rectification ahead of the bushfire season.

### Vegetation clearing

To reduce safety and bushfire risks, Endeavour Energy delivers annual vegetation management programs to maintain safe clearances between vegetation and powerlines. Clearance requirements are based on the Industry Safety Steering Committee (ISSC) 3 - Guide for the Management of Vegetation in the Vicinity of Electricity Assets.

In areas where vegetation presents an ongoing risk or where clearance activities are constrained, alternative solutions may be considered, including line relocation, conversion to covered conductor, or undergrounding, where appropriate.




Figure B.6: Bushfire Mitigation Investments in coming years

**Covered conductor project**

Following a review of the 2019-20 bushfires, Endeavour Energy fast-tracked a project to replace bare overhead conductor with covered conductor to further reduce the risk of bushfire ignition.

Recent advances in bushfire risk modelling have enabled more precise identification of locations across the network with an elevated risk of bushfire ignition. The modelling identified several locations representing the highest bushfire ignition risk among Endeavour Energy's HV distribution spans. As a result, additional investment in bushfire risk mitigation works has been approved for delivery in future years.

**Fire mesh**

Following the 2019-20 bushfires, investment was approved for the application of fire mesh to high-risk timber poles to help protect them from ignition during bushfire events. The case for investment recommended the proactive installation of Fire Mesh on selected poles based on risk assessments, together with reactive deployment where overhead lines are threatened by bushfire.

Collectively, these measures are expected to enhance network resilience to bushfire and improve the reliability of electricity supply to customers.

**Early Fault Detection**

Endeavour Energy continues to roll out Fault Anticipation Technology. Early Fault Detection (EFD) units now provide real-time monitoring across 23 high-risk feeders, enabling developing defects to be identified at an early stage. This allows repairs to be prioritised before faults escalate, reducing bushfire risk and improving network reliability.

**Emergency preparedness and response**

Endeavour Energy is committed to maintaining a high level of preparedness to ensure incidents can be responded to and managed effectively. Effective operational responses help minimise risks to workers and members of the public, limit disruption to customer supply, protect network assets, and reduce potential environment impacts.

Year-round emergency response and incident management arrangements are maintained to support the effective management of incidents that may occur during the bushfire season. During incidents, communication activities are coordinated in accordance with incident management processes to ensure responders and stakeholders are kept informed of response activities and network impacts.

At an organisational level, the IMP is activated when the scale or complexity of an incident requires a coordinated response and significant reprioritisation of operational resources. The IMP has a broad scope and has been designed

to respond to a wide range of major network incidents. It provides a framework which defines the actions to be taken upon declaration of a major disruptive event by providing:

- guiding principles for response;
- the company's structure for management of an incident;
- roles and responsibilities for management of an incident;
- escalation and notification schedules;
- checklists for initial considerations upon activation of an incident;
- checklists to monitor that planning addresses all the relevant issues; and
- the type of documentation required to be retained.

Following an incident, communication and reporting processes continue to provide updates on network conditions, residual risks and actions taken to maintain network security. In addition, where the BoM issues a Catastrophic Fire Danger Rating for a designated area, planned electricity supply interruptions affecting customers within that area are deferred in accordance with Endeavour Energy's Planned Interruption Cancellation Policy for hot and TOBAN days.





Figure B.7: Planned Interruption Cancellation Policy for Hot and TOBAN days

### Liaison with NSW RFS and with local councils

Endeavour Energy maintains strong relationships with the NSW RFS, Fire and Rescue NSW, local councils, National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), and other key stakeholders. Endeavour Energy has identified staff to perform the Liaison Officer role for each local government area. Endeavour Energy has designated Liaison Officers for each LGA within its network area. These Liaison Officers participate in Local Emergency Management Committees and Bushfire Management Committees, supporting information sharing, coordination and preparedness activities throughout the year and in advance of each bushfire season.

In addition, Endeavour Energy field staff complete the NSW RFS online bushfire awareness training, which outlines the safety requirements associated with working in and around bushfire-prone areas.

Endeavour Energy's bushfire mitigation teams also participate in quarterly working group meetings with other NSW DNSPs and the NSW RFS Data Analytics Team to further develop bushfire risk modelling methodologies and improve the identification and treatment of bushfire ignition risk.

**Communications**

Prior to the bushfire and storm season, Endeavour Energy proactively distributes safety-related media releases. Information is also made available through Endeavour Energy's website and social media channels, including:

- Bushfire and storm safety advice;
- Dangers of vegetation near powerlines; and
- Electrical safety information for emergency services personnel.

Advertising campaigns are tailored to address seasonal risks and reinforce relevant safety messages. Where aerial patrols are undertaken as part of pre-summer network inspections, radio and media notifications are issued to advise communities of the planned activities.

Endeavour Energy's Contact Centre plays a key role in providing customers with timely information on supply restoration activities during incidents. Contact Centre staff are regularly provided with updated information and access to key contacts across the business to support the prompt resolution of customer enquiries. The Contact Centre also provides a valuable feedback mechanism, with information received from customers recorded in internal systems and escalated to the System Operations team where appropriate. This contributes to improved situational awareness for System Operators and the IMT.

During incidents, information updates are regularly communicated through Endeavour Energy's website and social media channels. Information may also be provided through traditional media outlets, as appropriate, to support public awareness and stakeholder communication.

**Standards**

In bushfire-prone areas, Endeavour Energy has adopted standards that require new powerlines to be installed underground where practicable or, where overhead construction is permitted, to use predominantly covered or insulated conductor.

Endeavour Energy's vegetation management standard has also been enhanced to incorporate consequence-based risk ratings for cutting maps, enabling vegetation management activities to be more effectively prioritised ahead of the bushfire season. These ratings are informed by outputs from the University of Melbourne's Phoenix RapidFire Bushfire Simulator and supporting risk assessment decision tool.

**Total Fire Ban Days**

Endeavour Energy has installed reclosing devices at most zone substations and many field locations. Under normal operating conditions, these devices automatically isolate supply following a fault and attempt to restore supply after a short period. This approach helps maintain network reliability as many faults are transient in nature, such as temporary vegetation contact with powerlines.

In accordance with ISSC 33 *Guideline for Network Configuration During High Bushfire Risk Days*, Endeavour Energy applies a risk-based approach to determining where enhanced protection settings are required on TOBAN days. Since 2024, enhanced protection settings have been applied to high bushfire risk circuits within bushfire-prone areas. These settings involve disabling auto-reclosing and enabling fast-tripping protection on selected high-voltage distribution circuits, including circuits with known defects that may increase bushfire ignition risk. This reduces the likelihood of electrical faults causing vegetation ignitions during periods of elevated bushfire risk.




Figure B.8: Feeders with Enhanced Bushfire Protection Settings (red)

# B.3 Aerial consumers mains on bushfire prone land (HV and LV)

Aerial consumer mains are the overhead conductors and supporting structures between an electrical installation's main switchboard and the distribution network connection point.

**Low and high voltage overhead lines**

Endeavour Energy's routine overhead line inspection program includes the inspection of aerial low voltage consumer mains, including poles, conductors, and fittings. High voltage lines are inspected up to and including the high voltage metering point or the first point of protection (for example, a dropout fuse, circuit breaker, or switch fuse), whichever is first. Where no high voltage metering point exists, all poles are inspected for full length of the line.

Where defects are identified, the customer is notified in writing, and a copy of the notification provided to Endeavour Energy's Asset Protection Manager. The customer is responsible for having the defect repaired. Any defect that could result in a loose neutral connection, burning, or live metallic structure are treated as an emergency/hazardous situation and referred to the OLI/GLI team for immediate action.

The program also includes inspection of aerial consumer mains located in bushfire-prone areas. In a similar manner to the routine OLI inspection program, the customer is notified in writing of identified defects and given a timeframe within which to have the defect rectified. Where defects are not rectified within the required timeframe, Endeavour Energy may, under the powers available through the *Electricity Supply Act*, either undertake the necessary remedial works and recover the reasonable costs incurred or disconnect the installation from the electricity network.

**High Voltage Customers**

The maintenance of electrical assets owned by High Voltage Customers (HVC) is the responsibility of the asset owner. These requirements are set out in Endeavour Energy's HVC Operating Protocols. In addition, Endeavour Energy writes annually to HVCs reminding them of their obligation to inspect their assets and rectify any defects capable of initiating a fire before the commencements of the BFDP.

HVCs are requested to formally confirm that inspections have been completed and any identified defects rectified. Where inspections have not been undertaken, or defects remains outstanding, Endeavour Energy assesses and implements appropriate risk mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood of a bushfire ignition arising from faults on the HVC network during high-risk conditions.

Table B.1 Aerial consumers mains on bushfire prone private land (HV and LV)

| Performance measure | Current reporting period[a] PSBI 2026 | | Last reporting period PSBI 2025 | | Two periods ago PSBI 2024 | | Three periods ago PSBI 2023 | | Four periods ago PSBI 2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Target | Actual | Target | Actual | Target | Actual | Target | Actual | Target | Actual |
| Private LV lines[bc] checked by the network operator | | | | | 49,156 | 49,156 | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| - Phase 1 | 33,812 | 33,812 | 33,144 | 33,144 | | | | | | |
| - Phase 2 | 11,561 | 11,561 | 12,046 | 10,091 | | | | | | |
| Number of directions for bushfire risk mitigation issued to LV customers by the network operator[de] | N/A | 47 | N/A | 36 | N/A | 36 | N/A | 42 | N/A | 73 |
| Number of directions for bushfire risk mitigation issued to LV customers by the network operator that have exceeded the timeframe for rectification specified in the direction notice and remain unresolved[d] | N/A | 0 | N/A | 0 | N/A | 0 | N/A | 0 | N/A | 0 |
| HV customers (metering point count) advised to undertake pre-season bushfire checks in accordance with ISSC 31 | 74 | 74 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 |
| HV customers (metering point count) providing statements of compliance in accordance with ISSC 31 | 74 | 72 | 73 | 59 | 73 | 73 | 75 | 73 | 84 | 47 |
| HV customers (metering point count) requiring additional risk mitigation prior to start of the reporting year[f] | N/A | 38 | N/A | 13 | N/A | 19 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| HV customers (metering point count) where additional risk mitigation has been completed prior to start of the reporting year | 38 | 36 | 13 | 6 | N/A | 19 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 |

[a] All figures in Table B.1 is as at 1 October 2026.
[b] Private lines means aerial consumer mains on bushfire prone private land. Network operators may report in terms of numbers of LV installations or the numbers or percentage of areas targeted and checked.
[c] Endeavour Energy revised its annual PSBI program in 2025. Poles located within higher-risk areas are subject to a one-year inspection cycle (Phase 1) and inspected prior to the commencement of the BFDP, while poles on a two-year inspection cycle (Phase 2) continue to be inspected during the BFDP.
[d] Refers to directions issued under section 53C of the Electricity Supply Act 1995.
[c] Industry Safety Steering Committee Guideline ISSC Guide 31 – Guideline for the Management of Private Overhead Lines.
[e] N/A indicates that no target has been established for these performance measures.
[f] Includes the number of high voltage customers who did not provide a statement of compliance or had identified defects requiring mitigation, where the network operator is ensuring appropriate risk mitigation (eg, inspection by the network operator).

Table B.2 Pre-summer bushfire inspections

| Pre-summer bushfire inspections[9] | Population (spans/poles) | Target | Achieved | Outstanding | Open | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Year Cycle Poles | 118,257 | 118,257 | 118,257 | 0 | 0 | |
| 2 Year Cycle Poles | 93,790 | 47,756 | 47,387 | 0 | 387 | The target of 47,756 is due for completion by 31 December 2026. Accordingly, remaining open items are within the approved delivery timeframe. |

Note: As outlined in Section B.2, Endeavour Energy revised its annual PSBI program in 2025. Poles located within higher-risk areas are subject to a one-year inspection cycle and inspected prior to the commencement of the BFDP, while poles on a two-year inspection cycle continue to be inspected during the BFDP.

[9] All figures in Table B.2 are as at 1 October 2026.

Table B.3 Vegetation tasks

| Bushfire risk category | Status | Encroachment Classification A1[a] | Encroachment Classification A2[b] | Encroachment Classification A3[c] | Encroachment Classification A4[d] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Network Defects** | | | | | |
| Bushfire Prone Network (Target: 31 August) | Identified | 377 | 500 | 560 | 90 |
| | Completed | 377 | 500 | 560 | 90 |
| | Open | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Outstanding | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bushfire Prone Network (Target: 30 September) | Identified | 3,982 | 3,531 | 4,617 | 1,778 |
| | Completed | 3,969 | 3,498 | 4,602 | 1,777 |
| | Open | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Outstanding | 13 | 33 | 15 | 1 |
| Bushfire Prone Network (Target: 31 October) | Identified | 0 | 0 | 1,952 | 641 |
| | Completed | 0 | 0 | 1,269 | 523 |
| | Open | 0 | 0 | 683 | 118 |
| | Outstanding | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bushfire Prone Network (Target: 31 November) | Identified | 0 | 0 | 958 | 1,174 |
| | Completed | 0 | 0 | 654 | 854 |
| | Open | 0 | 0 | 304 | 320 |
| | Outstanding | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bushfire Prone Network (Target: 31 December) | Identified | 0 | 0 | 1,813 | 9,276 |
| | Completed | 0 | 0 | 976 | 6,109 |
| | Open | 0 | 0 | 837 | 3,167 |
| | Outstanding | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

The majority of outstanding September-due defects remain open due to wet ground conditions. Saturated paddocks and access tracks cannot safely support the heavy plant required to undertake vegetation trimming and maintenance activities. These spans are subject to ongoing monitoring and regular site visits by the contractor and will be rectified as soon as conditions permit.

[a] A1 – vegetation has encroached as far as 75-100% into the minimum vegetation clearance
[b] A2 – vegetation has encroached as far as 50-75% into the minimum vegetation clearance
[c] A3 – vegetation has encroached as far as 25-50% into the minimum vegetation clearance.
[d] A4 – vegetation has encroached as far as 0-25% into the minimum vegetation clearance.

Table B.3 Vegetation tasks

| Bushfire risk category | Status | Encroachment Classification A1[a] | Encroachment Classification A2[b] | Encroachment Classification A3[c] | Encroachment Classification A4[d] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Customer Defects** | | | | | |
| Bushfire Prone Network (Target: 31 August) | Identified | 196 | 73 | 51 | 17 |
| | Completed | 196 | 73 | 51 | 17 |
| | Open | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Outstanding | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bushfire Prone Network (Target: 30 September) | Identified | 1,338 | 455 | 438 | 175 |
| | Completed | 1,338 | 455 | 438 | 175 |
| | Open | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Outstanding | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bushfire Prone Network (Target: 31 October) | Identified | 0 | 0 | 99 | 45 |
| | Completed | 0 | 0 | 72 | 38 |
| | Open | 0 | 0 | 27 | 7 |
| | Outstanding | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bushfire Prone Network (Target: 31 November) | Identified | 0 | 0 | 24 | 89 |
| | Completed | 0 | 0 | 22 | 76 |
| | Open | 0 | 0 | 2 | 13 |
| | Outstanding | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bushfire Prone Network (Target: 31 December) | Identified | 0 | 0 | 9 | 242 |
| | Completed | 0 | 0 | 8 | 193 |
| | Open | 0 | 0 | 1 | 49 |
| | Outstanding | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Note: Hazard trees form part of the Hazard Tree Program and not part of the Bushfire Program. Therefore, these are not included within this table.

[a] A1 – vegetation has encroached as far as 75-100% into the minimum vegetation clearance
[b] A2 – vegetation has encroached as far as 50-75% into the minimum vegetation clearance
[c] A3 – vegetation has encroached as far as 25-50% into the minimum vegetation clearance.
[d] A4 – vegetation has encroached as far as 0-25% into the minimum vegetation clearance.

Table B.4 Asset tasks

| Status | Category 1[a] | Category 2[b] | Category 3[c] | Category 4[d] | Totals | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identified | 38 | 345 | 393 | 2 | 778 | |
| Completed | 38 | 345 | 392 | 2 | 777 | |
| Open[e] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Outstanding[e] | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | One transmission PSBI hardware defect remains outstanding as additional works are required to transfer supply to an alternative feeder before rectification can occur. The defect has been assessed as safe and is being regularly monitored, with rectification scheduled by 6 November 2026. |

Note: Categorisation of defects is in accordance with Endeavour Energy's Substation Maintenance Instruction SMI 124 – Maintenance Data Entry and Defect Prioritisation.


**Identification of asset tasks**

Asset tasks "Identified" represents the number of defects requiring remediation following Endeavour Energy's review of the defects identified through the PSBI contractor's inspection process. Each defect is subject to a detailed assessment by an experienced pole inspector/auditor to verify consistency with Endeavour Energy's Main Maintenance Instruction MMI 0002 – Distribution Overhead Defect Handbook. Insights from these reviews are used to improve the accuracy and consistency of defect identification in future PSBI inspection programs.

[a] Category 1 refers to defects that pose a direct and immediate risk to safety of the public/staff, and/or to the network availability, requiring diversion of resources to isolate supply if required and control/repair the defect.
[b] Category 2 refers to defects that pose risks to safety of the public/staff, and/or the network availability, where the asset condition is such that a response in a period materially less than the business-as-usual processes for arrangement of isolations, materials ordering, and resource allocation is required.
[c] Category 3 refers to defects that pose a non-immediate risk to the safe and/or reliable operation of the network over the short term and would be prioritised for action during this period using the business-as-usual processes.
[d] Category 4 defects do not impose a level of risk that warrants an escalated priority response but do represent a risk which needs to be managed and resolved in the medium term.
[e] See Glossary for definitions of open and outstanding.

# Glossary

## Reporting requirements



Endeavour Energy

## Glossary

| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Assisted failure | Any functional failure of a piece of equipment (component of an asset or asset) where the equipment was subject to an external force or energy source against which the network operator's standards for design and maintenance do not attempt to control. |
| Fire | A state, process, or instance of combustion in which fuel or other material is ignited and combined with oxygen, giving off light, heat, and flame. This includes 'smouldering' or 'smoke' events, and LV wires down events resulting in burning around the point of contact on a combustible surface. Excludes LV wires down arcing events on non-combustible surfaces.<br><br>Network Scope: Applicable to any fire caused by, or impacting, a network asset. |
| Functional failure | Performance of a piece of equipment (or component of an asset or asset) that represents a reduction below acceptable limits of the specification for a piece of equipment resulting in reduced capability required for service. In general, a functional failure is represented by a defect condition where the equipment that is required for service can no longer perform its expected function, and which results in an unplanned maintenance action to restore condition to an acceptable limit.<br><br>Note: operation of protection equipment (eg. fuse) within its design characteristics is not a functional failure. |
| Incident | Defined in accordance with IPART's Electricity networks reporting manual – Incident reporting, available on the IPART website. |
| Major Incident | Defined in accordance with IPART's Electricity networks reporting manual – Incident reporting, available on the IPART website. |
| Network SAPS | Stand-alone power systems, which consist of a distribution system owned, controlled, or operated, or proposed to be owned, controlled, or operated, by a network operator. |
| Network worker | A person who has been authorised by the network operator to plan or conduct work on or near the network. Includes persons employed by the network, persons engaged under a contract by the network operator, and persons authorised by the network operator and working for an Accredited Service Provider. |
| Open (with respect to defects/tasks) | A defect/task that has not been rectified by the network operator but where the time that has elapsed since being identified has not exceeded the standard time that the network operator has set for having the defect rectified. |
| Outstanding (with respect to defects/tasks) | A defect/task that has not been rectified by the network operator where the time that has elapsed since being identified has exceeded the standard time that the network operator has set for having the defect rectified |
| Public worker | A party or parties that are conducting work that is not directly associated with the electricity network such as building work, landscaping, landfill work, excavations, road works and includes the construction, maintenance, adjustment or dismantling of mobile plant and scaffolding. |
| Unassisted failure | Any functional failure of a piece of equipment (component of an asset or asset) where the cause of the failure is of a type for which the network operator's design and maintenance standards include specific controls to mitigate against the risk of failure and which is neither an assisted failure nor a maintenance induced failure. These failures are generally caused by a deterioration of the condition of the equipment and also include overhead connection failures and vegetation within the mandatory vegetation clearance window. |

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