



# The Evolution of Ransomware

From Floppies to Droppers

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# Story Time

- First Ransomware
- Evolution
- What changed?
- What can we learn?
- How can we address it?



# What was the First Ransomware Incident?

- 2006
- 1989
- 1996
- 2013



# The First Ransomware - 1989

Dear Customer:

It is time to pay for your software lease from PC Cyborg Corporation.  
Complete the INVOICE and attach payment for the lease option of your choice.  
If you don't use the printed INVOICE, then be sure to refer to the important  
reference numbers below in all correspondence. In return you will receive:

- a renewal software package with easy-to-follow, complete instructions;
- an automatic, self-installing diskette that anyone can apply in minutes.

Important reference numbers: A5599796-2695577-

The price of 365 user applications is US\$189. The price of a lease for the  
lifetime of your hard disk is US\$378. You must enclose a bankers draft,  
cashier's check or international money order payable to PC CYBORG CORPORATION  
for the full amount of \$189 or \$378 with your order. Include your name,  
company, address, city, state, country, zip or postal code. Mail your order  
to PC Cyborg Corporation, P.O. Box 87-17-44, Panama 7, Panama.

Press ENTER to continue




# The First Ransomware - The AIDS Trojan

## Delivery



## Encryption



## Business Model







# Screen lockers (2010)



## Your computer has been locked!

Your computer has been locked due to suspicion of illegal content downloading and distribution. (494 kb of video file) was automatically classified as child pornographic materials. Such actions, in whole or in part, violate following U.S. Federal Laws:

- 18 U.S.C. § 2257 - Sexual Exploitation of Children/Production of Child Pornography
- 18 U.S.C. § 2252 - Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors (Production, distribution and receipt of child pornography)
- 18 U.S.C. § 2252A - Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography

Any individual who violates, or attempts to violate, or conspires to violate mentioned laws shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment from 4 to 30 years and shall be fined up to \$250,000.

**Technical details:**  
Involved IP address: [REDACTED]  
Involved host name: [REDACTED]  
Source or intermediary sites: [REDACTED]

All suspicious files from your computer were transmitted to a special server and shall be used as evidence. Don't try to corrupt any data or interfere your account in an unauthorized way.

Your case can be classified as occasional/unintentional, according to title 17 U.S. Code § 512. Thus it may be closed without prosecution. Your computer will be unlocked automatically.

In order to resolve the situation in an above-mentioned way you should pay a fine of \$250.

Permanent lock on 07/16/2013 6:9 p.m. EST

### HOW TO UNLOCK YOUR COMPUTER:

-  Take your cash to one of this retail locations:  

-  Get a MoneyPak and purchase it with cash at the register
-  Come back and enter your MoneyPak code to unlock your computer (5 attempts available)

Code:



Die Erstellung Ihrer Windows-Kopie wurde automatisch überprüft und nicht bestanden.  
Es wird empfohlen, eine Windows-Lizenz zu erwerben (zu einem Online-Bestell für 100 Euro von Microsoft Corporation zu zahlen).

Ihre Aktivierung ist folgendermaßen notwendig:

1. Eine Paysafecard oder eine Kreditkarte im Wert von 100 Euro zu kaufen.  
(Bank-Karten und Paysafecards sind bei der Post und anderen Verkaufsstellen erhältlich.)
2. Die 16-stellige Microsoft-Kennzahl und die Paysafecard/Kredit-PIN-Codes auf der Aktivierungsoberfläche von Microsoft unter [microsoft.com/activation](http://microsoft.com/activation) eingeben.
3. Den Aktivierungscode, den Sie per E-Mail oder SMS erhalten haben, eingeben.


Falls Sie innerhalb 48 Stunden Ihre Kopie von Microsoft Windows nicht aktivieren und die Warnung ignorieren, so werden alle Daten ohne Wiederherstellungsmöglichkeit einschließlich Ihrer Windows-Kopie gelöscht.

In Zusammenarbeit, dass Ihr Versuch auf Aktivierung nach <http://microsoft.com> einer stufenweisen Verweigerung des Internetzugriffs unterliegt, wird Ihre IP-Adresse der Staatensicherheit übergeben.

Siehe gehen Sie Ihren Aktivierungscode ein und drücken Sie auf Aktivieren.

© Microsoft Corporation

# Cryptoviral Extortion/Asymmetric Encryption (1996)



## Cryptovirology: Extortion-Based Security Threats and Countermeasures\*

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### Abstract


Traditionally, cryptography and its applications are defensive in nature, and provide privacy, authentication, and security to users. In this paper we present the idea of *Cryptovirology* which employs a twist on cryptography, showing that it can also be used offensively. By being offensive we mean that it can be used to mount extortion based attacks that cause loss of access to information, loss of confidentiality, and information leakage, tasks which cryptography typically prevents. In this paper we analyze potential threats and attacks that rogue use of cryptography can cause when combined with rogue software (viruses, Trojan horses), and demonstrate them experimentally by presenting an implementation of a cryptovirus that we have tested (we took careful precautions in the process to insure that the virus remained contained). Public-key cryptography is essential to the attacks that we demonstrate (which we call "cryptovirological attacks"). We also suggest countermeasures and mechanisms to cope with and prevent such attacks. These attacks have implications on how the use of cryptographic tools should be managed and audited in general purpose computing environments, and imply that access to cryptographic tools should be well controlled. The experimental virus demonstrates how cryptographic packages can be condensed into a small space, which may have independent applications (e.g., cryptographic module design in small mobile devices).

atomic fusion is to energy production), because it allows people to store information securely and to conduct private communications over large distances. It is therefore natural to ask, "What are the potential harmful uses of Cryptography?" We believe that it is better to investigate this aspect rather than to wait for such attacks to occur. In this paper we attempt a first step in this direction by presenting a set of cryptography-exploiting computer security attacks and potential countermeasures.

The set of attacks that we present involve the unique use of strong (public key and symmetric) cryptographic techniques in conjunction with computer virus and Trojan horse technology. They demonstrate how cryptography (namely, difference in computational capability) can allow an adversarial virus writer to gain explicit access control over the data that his or her virus has access to (assuming the infected machines have only polynomial-time computational power), whereas from an information theoretic point of view (assuming all parties are all-powerful) this is impossible. This idea is then extended to allow a distributed virus to gain itself explicit access control over the information on infected machines, provided it is not detected early enough and vigorously destroyed. This shows that viruses can be used as tools for extortion, potential criminal activity, and as munitions in the context of information warfare, rather than their traditional reputation of being merely a source for disturbance and annoyance. In general, we define cryptovirology to be the study of the applications of cryp-



# RSA Encrypted- GPCode (2006)



# Exfiltrating Ransomware (Late 2010's)

## Ransomware: The Data Exfiltration and Double Extortion Trends

Part 3 in a series on Malware

### Overview

The Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center's (MS-ISAC) Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) team assesses it is highly likely ransomware groups will continue to steal and port victim data throughout 2021, as an added revenue generator and double extortion tactic. By threatening to publicly post confidential data, ransomware groups are placing additional pressure on victims to pay (or the ransom for the promise of outright deleting or keeping stolen data confidential). Besides publicly posting data, ransomware groups sell stolen data in cybercriminal forums and dark web marketplaces for additional revenue. Data from Chainalysis shows the total amount paid by ransomware victims increased 371% in 2020, amounting to nearly \$250 million worth of cryptocurrency. [1] In one high-profile example, a public university reportedly paid over \$1 million on BitLocker to recover its encrypted files and delete the stolen data. [2]

Throughout 2020, the MS-ISAC CTI team observed ransomware groups increasingly turning to double extortion attempts with stolen data, while maintaining the traditional network encryption and ransom routine. Ransomware groups continue to exfiltrate data during intrusions, mimicking the Maze ransomware group's tactic of publishing stolen victim data, which made headlines in late 2019.


### Threat to SLTTs

The recent trend of CTA's using data exfiltration as leverage over State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) systems is especially impactful to organizations housing sensitive information, such as public healthcare entities and K-12 school districts. These public sector targets remain popular because of their essential services and public sensitivity on protecting children and the ill. Thus, these organizations feel an internal sense of urgency joined with public pressure to resume operations quickly, which often leaves actors (CTAs) are taking advantage of via higher ransom amounts.

## Data Exfiltration During a Ransomware Attack




# Business Model



[illegible]

# Electronic Currencies






# Bitcoin (2013)



## Delivery



# The “Sneakernet”- 1980’s, 1990’s (Technically includes modern USB)

## IBM PC VIRUS PATTERNS

The following are hexadecimal patterns of known viruses affecting IBM PCs and compatibles. This can be used to detect the presence of the virus by the “search” routine of disk utility programs such as The Norton Utilities or your favourite disk scanning program (See *ITN Nov 89*).

### Seen viruses

405	26A2 4902 26A2 4002 26A2 4902 504B 19CD ; Offset 00A
Alabaster	8CDD 33DB 8E0B 8907 0847 0274 7489 1F89 ; Offset 109
Brain	A004 7CA2 097C 860E 077C 890E 0A7C 5857 ; Offset 150
Cascade (1) 01	0F6D B74D 018C 820E 3134 3124 464C 75F8 ; Offset 113, 1701 bytes, Falling characters
Cascade (1) 04	0F6D B74D 018C 850E 3134 3124 464C 75F8 ; Offset 113, 1704 bytes, Falling characters
Cascade (1) Y4	FAB8 CD68 0000 5851 8531 012E 8687 2A01 ; Offset 100, 1704 bytes, Falling characters
Cascade format	0F6D B74D 018C 850E 3134 3124 464C 71F8 ; Offset 113, 1704 bytes, Formats hard disk
Dark Avenger	740E FAFB 8581 C40E 09F8 ; Offset 068, 1800 bytes
Datanorm (1)	3601 0183 8E03 8BC8 3D00 0075 03E9 0201 ; Offset 002, 1188 bytes
Datanorm (2)	3601 0183 8E03 8BC8 3D00 0075 03E9 F000 ; Offset 002, 1280 bytes
Datanorm II	2E8A 072E C605 2282 CDD0 ; Offset 022, 1514 bytes
DRASE	5DBB 0A7B C021 3D7F 0A74 026B 8A54 E800 ; Offset 636, 1864 bytes
DRASE Destroy	B90D 01BA 0000 8EEA 33DB 90CD 2A38 403C ; Offset 735, 1864 bytes
Den Tuk	F8AC C88E D88E 00BC 00F0 F8B8 787C 30C3 ; Offset 0
Disk Killer	2E41 1304 2058 802E A313 0481 06D3 E08E ; Offset 0C3
Fu Manchu	FCB4 E1CD 218F FCB1 7316 80FC 0472 11B4 ; Offset 18E, 2086 bytes COM, 2080 bytes EXE
Icelandic (1)	2EC6 0687 020A 9050 5351 5256 1E8B 0A43 ; Offset 0C5, 656 bytes
Icelandic (2)	2EC6 0679 0202 9050 5351 5256 1E8B 0A43 ; Offset 0B6, 642 bytes
Icelandic (3)	2EC6 066F 020A 9050 5351 ; Offset 106, 632 bytes
Italian-Gem	B106 D3E2 20C0 076E C08E 007C 88F8 8500 ; Offset 030
Italian	32E4 CD1A F4C6 7975 0A6F C2F0 7505 32E8 ; Offset 0F0
Jerusalem	03F7 2E8B 8D11 00CD 218C C805 1000 8E00 ; Offset 0AC, 1813 bytes COM, 1808 bytes EXE
Lehigh	BD54 FC0B 44FE 8ED8 B844 25CD 2106 1733 ; Offset 1EF
Mistake	32E4 CD1A 80FF 0376 0A8D 9090 9090 32E8 ; Offset 0F0
MIX1	B80D 008E C026 803E 3C03 7775 095F 3E59 ; Offset 02E
MIX1-2	B80D 008E C08E 7103 268B 3E84 0083 C70A ; Offset 02A
New Zealand (1)	0400 B801 020E 07BB 0002 B901 0033 029C ; Offset 043
New Zealand (2)	0400 B801 020E 07BB 0002 73C9 B802 419C ; Offset 041


## The Virus Adventure

Gordon's recounting of her first experience with a computer virus recalls a familiar story - her machine became infected. 'I got this old XT, and it was really slow and it kept locking up. I thought that something was wrong, and as I had been reading the Virus echo on *Fidonet* for a little bit, I realised that I might have a virus. I downloaded a copy of *McAfee Scan*, and sure enough, I had PingPong.B. I followed the instructions, typed CLEAN, and it was gone. I thought that was great... and the next day it was back again.'

At the time, she had problems convincing those around her that the problem was real; in 1991, viruses were still very much a novelty. 'Nobody believed that I had a virus; they would say that I was just making it up, and that *nobody* got viruses. I was really upset, because this virus just kept coming back, so I wrote to a vendor, "I think I have this terrible new virus, and it won't go away. I would send you a sample, but I don't know how..."'

Gordon then scanned every file on every disk she owned, including those for her *Tandy CoCo*, unzipping every ZIP file - even though PingPong is a boot sector virus. 'I wasted about six weeks before someone on the Virus echo told me "Here. This is what you really need to do". That was the start of my virus adventure, I guess.'

# “Spam” Email and Exploit kits - late 90’s until today



## Melissa – The Little Virus That Could...



Ian Whalley  
Sophos Plc

*[After this analysis VB gauges IVPC's reaction to Melissa. Sarah Gordon's feature also mentions its author. Ed.]*

Saturday 27 March was going to be a quiet day – or at least, that was what I thought when I got up at around 8.30am. After a quick breakfast, I dialled my ISP to retrieve my email and read some news. Shortly afterwards, I was in the car on the way to the office.

Newsgroups, mailing lists, on-line news services – all were talking about one thing; a macro virus called Melissa that was (apparently) causing havoc in North America. Companies were reported as being effectively forced to stop all internal and external email in an effort to halt its spread.


# Trojans, Botnets, Multistage Attacks, and Malware as a Service (2010)







# The Evolution of Ransomware


## Delivery



## Encryption



## Business Model



# Disrupting the Attackers

